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State v. Smith: Facilitating the Admissibility of Hearsay
Statements in Child Sexual Abuse Cases
Child sexual abuse has reached alarming proportions. I The National Committee for the Prevention of Child Abuse reported that in 1984 there were more
than 123,000 reports of child sexual abuse, a thirty-five percent increase over
1983.2 It is generally agreed, however, that the reported cases, particularly for

child sexual abuse, greatly underestimate the actual incidence. 3 A Los Angeles
Times survey, for example, found that at least twenty-two percent of the respon-

dents reported they had been victims of child sexual abuse. 4 The reluctance to
report is not surprising given that the vast majority of child sexual abuse is committed by friends, acquaintances, and6 relatives, - so that reporting might result in
family disruption and public shame.

Even reported child sexual abuse, however, is unlikely to result in a conviction. Because of the nature of the crime, the child is often the only witness to
the incident. 7 Corroborative physical evidence may be unavailable because the

offender has used threats of violence, rather than actual force, to induce the
child to submit.8 Even when physical injury has occurred, the signs may no
longer be visible if reporting is delayed. 9
If criminal charges are brought and the case goes to trial, other evidentiary

problems are presented. Often a considerable length of time has elapsed since
the incident, and the child's memory of the event may be impaired.' 0 The child
1. Although child abuse is not a new phenomenon, it has recently been "discovered" as a
major social problem. Pfohl, The "Discovery" of ChildAbuse, in CHILD A3USE: COMMISSION AND
OMISSION 323 (J. Cook & R. Bowles eds. 1980) (historical overview of social reaction to child
abuse).
2. N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1985, § 1, at 30, col. 1. A study by the Child Welfare League of
America revealed that reports of sexual abuse of children increased 50% from 1983 to 1984. Id.,
Mar. 19, 1986, at C14, col. 5. It is uncertain whether "the increase is due to more incidents of abuse,
more effective identification, or expansion in the reporting requirements themselves." Elmer, A Follow-up Study of Traumatized Children, in CHILD ABUSE: COMMISSION AND OMISSION, supra note
1, at 423.
3. See, e.g., Kempe, Sexual Abuse: Another Hidden Pediatric Problem, in CHILD ABUSE:
COMMISSION AND OMISSION, supra note 1, at 99. MacFarlane, Sexual Abuse of Children, in THE
VICrMIZArbON OF WOMEN 81, 86 (J. Chapman & M. Gates eds. 1978); Nakashima & Zakus, Incest: Review and ClinicalExperience, in CHILD ABUSE: COMMISSION AND OMISSION, supranote 1,
at 110.
4. L.A. Times, Aug. 25, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 2. The survey found that 27% of the females and
16% of the males responding had been victims of child sexual abuse.
5. MacFarlane, supra note 3, at 86.
6. Kempe, supra note 3, at 99.
7. See NAT'L LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY & PROTECTION, AM. BAR
ASS'N, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING LEGAL INTERVENTION IN INTRAFAMILY CHILD

SEXUAL ABUSE CASES 30 (J. Bulkley reporter 1982) [hereinafter cited as ABA RECOMMENDATIONS].

8. Lloyd, The CorroborationofSexual Victimization of Children, in CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE &
THE LAW 103, 108 (National Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy & Protection, American
Bar Association, J. Bulkley ed. 1982).
9. Id. at 112.
10. ABA Guidelinesfor the FairTreatment of Child Witnesses in Cases Where Child Abuse is'
Alleged, May 1985, at 9.
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may also be so intimidated or confused by formal courtroom procedures and by
unsympathetic cross-examination that he or she will give incomplete or inaccu-

rate testimony."1 Finally, the child may retract a true report of intrafamily sexual abuse because of pressure from family members and the child's own feelings

of guilt. 12 As a result of these problems, critics have characterized 13the child
victim's encounter with the justice system as a second victimization.

This situation has resulted in a reexamination of the justice system's response to child victims of sexual abuse. 14 Courts and legislatures have acted to
reduce the justice system's traumatization of child victims, while increasing the

probability of prosecution and conviction. 15 Among the most prominent and
controversial reforms have been the adoption of liberal interpretations of the
16
hearsay exceptions and the enactment of new child hearsay statutes.
Recently, the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Smith17 adopted a
broad posture toward the admissibility of statements made out of court by child
victims of sexual abuse. The victims in Smith were the four-year-old daughter
and the five-year-old niece of the woman with whom the defendant, Sylvester
Smith, was living.18 One night during the weekend of March 2, 1984, defendant
entered the bedroom of the girls and sexually assaulted them.1 9 The younger
girl related the incident to her grandmother approximately three days later. 20

As a result, the girls were taken to the hospital for examination and treatment 2 '

22
and subsequently received counseling from two Rape Task Force volunteers.

11. Id. at 13.
12. MacFarlane, supra note 3, at 101.
This author will never forget the look on the face of a 9-year-old incest victim when her
father was brought into the courtroom with chains and handcuffs around his hands and
waist. With support and reassurance from concerned professionals and family members,
she had, up until that point, coped remarkably well with the rigors of the judicial process.
Her only comment before she withdrew into a spasmodic, twitching episode (which recessed the trial for the day) was "I did that to my Daddy?"

Id. at 99.
13. Bohmer & Blumberg, Twice Traumatized: The Rape Victim and the Court, 58 JUDICATURE 391, 398-99 (1975); Melton, ProceduralReforms to Protect Child Victim/Witnesses in Sex
Offense Proceedings,in CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE LAW 184 (National Legal Resource Center
for Child Advocacy & Protection, American Bar Association, J. Bulkley ed. 1982).
14. See, ag., CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE LAW (National Legal Resource Center for Child
Advocacy & Protection, American Bar Association, J. Bulkley ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE LAW]; ABA RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 7.

15. These reforms include expanded hearsay exceptions, videotaped testimony, closed-circuit
television, the use of expert testimony, and specially constructed courtrooms. See Bulkley, Evidentiary and Procedural Trends in State Legislation and Other Emerging Legal Issues in Child Sexual
Abuse Cases, 89 DICK. L. REv. 645 (1985); Note, Child Witnesses in Sexual Abuse CriminalProceedings: Their Capabilities,Special Problems, and Proposalsfor Reform, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 157
(1985); Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARv. L. REv. 806 (1985).
16. See infra notes 121-128 and accompanying text.
17. 315 N.C. 76, 337 S.E.2d 833 (1985).
18. Id. at 79-80, 337 S.E.2d at 837.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 81, 337 S.E.2d at 837.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 86, 337 S.E.2d at 840.
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Defendant was convicted of one count of first-degree rape23 and two counts
24
each of first-degree sexual offense and taking indecent liberties with a minor.
These convictions were based in part on the testimony of the grandmother and
the Rape Task Force volunteers about statements the girls made to them about
the assaults.2 5 On appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court, 26 defendant
argued that the statements constituted inadmissible hearsay. 27 The court agreed
that the testimony of the Rape Task Force volunteers that did not corroborate
the children's testimony was inadmissible hearsay and ordered a new trial on the
charge of first-degree sexual offense involving the younger child. The court refused to find, however, that the grandmother's testimony was inadmissible hear28
say and upheld the convictions on the other charges.
The North Carolina Evidence Code, which became effective July 1, 1984,29
defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted." 3 0° Hearsay statements are generally excluded on the ground
that inaccuracies in testimony are less likely to be detected because the out-ofcourt declarant is not available for cross-examination.3 1 Further, the out-ofcourt declarant does not testify under oath and the trier of fact has no opportunity to observe the declarant's demeanor. 32 The general rule against hearsay
evidence, however, is subject to numerous exceptions based on the premise that
certain conditions may provide "circumstantial guarantees of [the statement's]
'33
trustworthiness."
Smith offered the North Carolina Supreme Court its first opportunity since
the new evidence code took effect to rule on three exceptions to the hearsay rule:
35
excited utterance,3 4 statements made for purposes of diagnosis and treatment,
and the residual exception. 3 6 Because the decision facilitates the admissibility of
statements made out of court by child victims, it has important implications for
the prosecution of child sexual abuse cases in North Carolina. This Note exam23. Id. at 79, 337 S.E.2d at 833. Defendant was acquitted of the first-degree rape of the fiveyear-old girl. Id. First-degree rape is vaginal intercourse with a child under thirteen when the
defendant is at least twelve and at least four years older than the child. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2
(Supp. 1985).
24. Smith, 315 N.C. at 79, 337 S.E.2d at 833.
25. Id. at 80, 337 S.E.2d at 837.
26. Defendant was sentenced to two concurrent life sentences and one consecutive life sentence.
Id. at 79. Life sentences are appealed directly to the North Carolina Supreme Court. N.C.R. APP.
P. 4(d).
27. Smith, 315 N.C. at 83, 337 S.E.2d at 839.
28. Id.
29. Act of July 7, 1983, ch. 701, § 3, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 684 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 8C-1 (Supp. 1985)).

30. N.C.R. EVID. 801(c). This definition of hearsay is identical to that of FED. R. EVID.
801(c).
31. See E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 245, at 728 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited

as MCCORMICK].
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 727.
FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee note.
See infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 37-42, 52-53 and accompanying text.

36. See infra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
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ines Smith and analyzes the court's interpretation of the hearsay exceptions to
the hearsay rule. The Note concludes that although Smith can be expected to
increase the probability of successful prosecution and conviction in child sexual
abuse cases, the enactment of a special child hearsay exception would better
achieve that goal.
The trial court in Smith admitted the testimony of the grandmother and the
Rape Task Force volunteers as substantive evidence under Rule 803(4), 37 the
medical diagnosis or treatment exception to the hearsay rule, Under this exception, statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment are admissible as evidence. 38 The rationale for the exception is that reliability is assured
because the declarant is strongly motivated to tell the truth to receive effective
treatment. 39 Although such statements are most often made to a physician;
statements made to others, including family members, might be included. 4° Because the children in Smith were diagnosed and treated as a result of their statements to their grandmother, the supreme court held that her testimony had been
41
properly admitted.
In addition to testifying as to what the children had told her about the
assault, the grandmother was allowed to give testimony that related to the
younger child's identification of "Sylvester" as her assailant. 4 2 Although statements concerning the cause of the crime are admissible under Rule 803(4) if they
are pertinent to diagnosis or treatment, statements as to fault are unlikely to fall
within this exception. 43 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, for example, has noted that statements naming the assailant "would seldom, if ever, be sufficiently related" to diagnosis and treatment to qualify. 44
Courts generally have not admitted statements attributing fault because of the
concern that motives unrelated to diagnosis or treatment may prompt the state45
ments and compromise their reliability.
Recently, however, some courts have adopted a more liberal policy toward
37. N.C.R. EvID. 803(4) admits these hearsay statements:
Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment.-Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present
symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or exter-

nal source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
This language is identical to that in FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
38. N.C.R. EvID. 803(4).
39. FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee note; McCORMICK, supra note 31, § 292, at 839.
40. FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee note.
41. Smith, 315 N.C. at 85, 337 S.E.2d at 840.
42. Id.
43. FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee note ("Thus a patient's statement that he was
struck by an automobile would qualify but not his statement that the car was driven through a red

light."); MCCORMICK, supra note 31, § 292, at 840.
44. United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 84 (8th Cir. 1980), cerL denied, 450 U.S. 1001
(1981).
45. 4 D. LOUIsELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 444, at 603-05 (1980). See, e.g.,
United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981); United
States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1979); State v. Reidhead, 146 Ariz. 314, 705 P.2d 1365
(1985); State v. Hebert, 480 A.2d 742 (Me. 1984).
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the admissibility of statements that identify the assailant. 4 6 In Goldade V.

State,47 for example, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the trial court
properly admitted under the medical diagnosis or treatment exception a child's
statements to a nurse and physician that identified her abuser. The Goldade
court concluded that the statements were made for purposes of diagnosis and

treatment because the identity of the assailant is relevant to whether the child is
in imminent danger and should be removed from the home as authorized by
Wyoming law.48 The Wyoming court added that a liberal interpretation of Rule

803(4) in child abuse cases would provide more protection for children and aid

49
in the prosecution of child abusers.
The Smith court cited Goldade and adopted a similar view of Rule 803(4),

reasoning that the trustworthiness of a statement would be intact if the motivation was to aid in diagnosis or treatment.5 0 Thus, the court held that the trial
court properly admitted the younger child's statement to her grandmother nam51
ing the defendant as her assailant.

Conversely, the court refused to extend Rule 803(4) to admit the testimony
of the Rape Task Force volunteers. Although the volunteers treated the children for the emotional effects of the assaults, they did so after the children had

been medically diagnosed and treated. 52 Therefore, the court held that their
testimony was not properly admitted under the medical diagnosis or treatment
53
exception.

The court then considered the State's contention that the grandmother's
testimony was also admissible under Rule 803(2), the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. 54 This exception allows the admission of hearsay statements that are a spontaneous reaction to a startling event.5 5 Such statements are

considered reliable on the theory that the excitement renders the declarant incapable of reflection and fabrication.5 6 Spontaneity is determined by the duration
of excitement 57 and not by "blind obedience to a clock and an hour-by-hour
46. See United States v. Rhodes, 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 1520 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1087 (1983); Purdy v. State, 343 So. 2d 4 (Fla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847 (1977);
People v. Wilkins, 134 Mich. App. 39, 349 N.W.2d 815 (1984); Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721
(Wyo.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1253 (1984).
47. 674 P.2d 721 (Wyo. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1253 (1984).
48. Id. at 725-26.
49. Id. at 727.
50. Smith, 315 N.C. at 85, 337 S.E.2d at 840.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 85-86, 337 S.E.2d at 840. One of the volunteers entered the emergency room of the
hospital as the doctor was leaving after treating the younger child. The court acknowledged the
possibility that the child may have confused the volunteer with medical personnel, but emphasized
that the child had already received treatment. Id.
53. Id.
54. N.C.R. EVID. 803(2) defines an "excited utterance" as "[a] statement relating to a startling
event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event
or condition." This language is identical to that in FED. R. EvID. 803(2).
55. MCCORMICK, supra note 31, § 297, at 854-55.
56. Id. at 855.
57. FED. R. EVID. 803(2) advisory committee note.
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count of the time that has passed between the event and the declaration." 5 8

Nevertheless, any significant passage of
time undermines the rationale for admit59

ting statements as excited utterances.
Many courts have construed the spontaneity requirement with greater leniency in child sexual abuse cases. 60 Courts have noted that children are likely to
repress the incident, 61 particularly when the offender has threatened them. 62 In
addition, courts have suggested that "children of tender years are generally not
adept at reasoned reflection and at concoction of false stories under such
63
circumstances."
In determining whether statements of sexually abused children are admissi58. State v. Creighton, 462 A.2d 980, 983 (R.I. 1983).
59. McCoRMICK, supra note 31, § 297, at 856.
60. See, eg., State v. Rodriquez, 8 Kan. App. 2d 353, 657 P.2d 79 (1983) (four hours); State v.
Prestridge, 399 So. 2d 564 (La. 1981) (eight hours); State v. Noble, 342 So. 2d 170 (La. 1977) (two
days); State v. Creighton, 462 A.2d 980 (R.I. 1983) (14 hours); State v. Woodward, 32 Wash. App.
204, 646 P.2d 135 (1982) (20 hours); State v. Padilla, 110 Wis. 2d 414, 329 N.W.2d 263 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1982) (three days). Cf. State v. Galvan, 297 N.W.2d 344, 347 (Iowa 1980) (child's conduct two
days after murder "close enough to the transaction so that the trial court could have believed any
presumption of fabrication was excluded").
Until recently, Michigan had expressly relaxed the spontaneity requirement when the victim
was of tender years. The tender years exception permitted the hearsay statements of a child victim
to be admitted as corroborative evidence, provided the delay in reporting was brief and the statement
was spontaneous. Note, The Final Resting of the "Tender Years" Exception to the Hearsay Rule:
People v. Kreiner, 1984 DET. C.L. REv. 117, 121 (1984). The Rules of Evidence adopted by the
Michigan Supreme Court in 1978 did not include the tender years exception and the court abolished
it in People v. Kreiner, 415 Mich. 372, 329 N.W.2d 716 (1982). Note, supra, at 125. The court held
that hearsay may not be admitted unless it comes within a specifically enumerated exception. Id. at
118. See also Note, A Tender Years Doctrinefor the Juvenile Courts: An Effective Way to Protect the
Sexually Abused Child, 61 U. DET. J. URn3. L. 249 (1984) (proposing that Michigan adopt a rule
allowing tender years testimony in juvenile court proceedings for abuse or neglect).
61. See State v. Padilla, 110 Wis. 2d 414, 419, 329 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982).
62. Id. at 421, 329 N.W.2d at 267 (defendant" 'would hit her' "); State v. Creighton, 462 A.2d
980, 983 (R.I. 1983) (defendant "'would have killed me' "; child "'
would get a
beating' "); State v. Woodward, 32 Wash. App. 204, 206, 646 P.2d 135, 136 (1982) ("defendant
would kill her").
63. Lancaster v. People, 200 Colo. 448, 453, 615 P.2d 720, 723 (1980); see also United States v.
Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1204 (9th Cir. 1979) ("childish terminology has the ring of veracity"); Colorado ex rel O.E.P., 654 P.2d 312, 318 (Colo. 1982) ("child... is hardly adept at the type of reasoned
reflection necessary to concoct a false story relating to a bizarre sexual experience"); State v. Posten,
302 N.W.2d 638, 640 (Minn. 1981) ("highly unlikely that a 6-year-old would have the capacity to
concoct a story like this").
This view is also supported by social science research. According to two experts on child sexual
abuse, there is no evidence "at all to support the fear that children often make false accusations of
sexual assault or misunderstand innocent behavior by adults." Berliner & Barbieri, The Testimony
of the Child Victim of Sexual.Assault, 40 J. Soc. ISSUES 125, 127 (1984). In one study, polygraph
tests were given to 147 children whose accounts of sexual abuse were questioned; only one child was
found to be lying. N. GROTH, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SEXUAL OFFENDER: RAPE, INCEST AND
CHILD MOLESTATION, Workshop presented by Psychological Associates of Albermarle in Charlotte, North Carolina, March 1980 (cited in Melton, Bulkley & Wulkan, Competency of Children as
Witnesses, in CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE LAW, supra note 14, at 125, 136).
One commentator suggests that a child's out-of-court statements of sexual abuse may be even
more reliable than those made in court because of the trauma of testifying. Melton, supra note 13, at
189. However, in another study involving a simulated eyewitness incident, the researchers concluded that "children as young as five years of age are no less competent or credible as eyewitnesses
than are adults when responding to direct objective questions." Main, Holmes, Guth & Kovac, The
Potentialof Childrenas Eyewitnesses, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 295, 304 (1979). The study also found
that children are no more susceptible to leading questions than adults. Id. at 303. But see Cohen &
Harnick, The Susceptibility of Child Witnesses to Suggestion, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 201 (1980)
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ble as excited utterances, courts have considered, in addition to age and lapse of

time, the child's physical and mental condition, 64 opportunity to speak, 65 fear of
the offender, 6 6 spontaneity of the report, 67 and nature of the assault. 68 Courts

have paid particular attention to the condition of the child at the time of the
69
declarations and have required that the child still be in a state of excitement.

Although calmness does not necessarily negate such a finding,70 the child cannot

have resumed a normal family routine.7 1 In addition, statements are more likely
to be admitted when the child reports the incident at the first reasonable oppor73
tunity, 72 and the offender has threatened the child with serious harm.

Although most statements that qualify as an excited utterance are made
within a relatively short period after the event, 74 some courts have admitted
statements made many hours and sometimes even days after the event. 75 In

State v. Padilla,7 6 for example, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that state-

(first testing found young children more susceptible to suggestion than older subjects, but second
testing revealed no significant differences).
64. See, eg., Haggins v. Warden, Fort Pillow State Farm, 715 F.2d 1050, 1058 (6th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1071 (1984); State v. Rivera, 139 Ariz. 409, 412, 678 P.2d 1373, 1376 (1984);
State v. Brown, 341 N.W.2d 10, 12-13 (Iowa 1983); State v. Woodward, 32 Wash. App. 204, 206,
646 P.2d 135, 137 (1982); In re G.P., 679 P.2d 976, 1004 (Wyo. 1984).
65. See, eg., State v. Messamore, 639 P.2d 413, 419 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1982); State v.
Prestridge, 399 So. 2d 564, 572 (La. 1981); State v. Duncan, 53 Ohio St. 2d 215, 221, 373 N.E.2d
1234, 1238 (1978).
66. See, eg., State v. Creighton, 462 A.2d 980, 983 (R.I. 1983); State v. Woodward, 32 Wash.
App. 204, 206, 646 P.2d 135, 137 (1982); State v. Padilla, 110 Wis. 2d 414, 421, 329 N.W.2d 263,
267 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982).
67. See, eg., United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 86 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1001 (1981); Fitzgerald v. United States, 443 A.2d 1295, 1304 (D.C. App. 1982); Walls v. State, 166
Ga. App. 503, 505, 304 S.E.2d 547, 550 (1983); State v. Brown, 341 N.W.2d 10, 13 (Iowa 1983).
68. See, eg., United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 86 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.

1001 (1981).
69. See, eg., Haggins v. Warden, Fort Pillow State Farm, 715 F.2d 1050, 1058 (6th Cir. 1983)
(child bleeding and in critical condition still "under the stress of excitement" hour to hour and a half
later), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1071 (1984); State v. Creighton, 462 A.2d 980, 983 (R.I. 1983) (child
"still laboring under the stress of a terrifying experience" 14 hours later); State v. Padilla, 110 Wis.
2d 414, 421, 329 N.W.2d 263, 267 (Wis. Ct.App. 1982) ("[S]tress from the assault was still upon the
girl three days after the assault."). Courts have refused to admit statements not made under stress or
excitement. See, eg., State v. Rivera, 139 Ariz. 409, 678 P.2d 1373 (1984) (next morning); Fitzgerald v. United States, 443 A.2d 1295 (D.C. App. 1982) (next day); Leybourne v. Commonwealth, 222
Va. 374, 282 S.E.2d 12 (1981) (per curiam) (four and one-half hours); State v. Slider, 38 Wash. App.
689, 688 P.2d 538 (1984) (next morning).
70. See, eg., United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 86 (8th Cir. 1980) (child was "calm and
unexcited"), cerL denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981); State v. Ritchey, 107 Ariz. 552, 556, 490 P.2d 558,
562 (1971) ("no requirement that... children ...be hysterical"); In re Parental Rights of G.P., 679
P.2d 976, 1004 (Wyo. 1984) (fact that child "exhibited signs of calmness does not rule out a finding
that she was emotionally distraught").
71. State v. Messamore, 639 P.2d 413, 419 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1982).
72. See State v. Prestridge, 399 So. 2d 564, 572 (La. 1981); see, e.g., State v. Duncan, 53 Ohio
St. 2d 215, 221, 373 N.E.2d 1234, 1238 (1978).
73. See supra note 62.
74. See, ag., United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980) (between 45 minutes and I
hour and 15 minutes), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1001 (1981); Lancaster v. People, 200 Colo. 448, 615
P.2d 720 (1980) (one-half hour); Walls v. State, 166 Ga. App. 503, 304 S.E.2d 547 (1983) (within 1
hour); People v. Pointer, 93 Ill.
App. 3d 1064, 418 N.E.2d 1 (1981) (5 or 7 minutes); State v. Hawkins, 49 Or. App. 1065, 621 P.2d 660 (1980) (20 minutes).
75. See supra note 60.
76. 110 Wis. 414, 329 N.W.2d 263 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982).
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ments made three days after the incident were properly admitted as "a special
species of the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule for statements
made by... [child victims] of sexual assault."' 77 The Wisconsin court concluded
that the three day time period, although longer than those in previously decided
cases, did not preclude a finding of spontaneity. 78 Because the child was still
under the stress of the assault, it was "highly unlikely that the child's rational
'79
mind could interpose itself between the event and the ultimate utterance."
The Smith court compared its fact pattern to that in Padilla.80 In both
cases the child victims had been sexually assaulted and threatened by the
mothers' boyfriends and were "scared" at the time of the declarations, which
occurred approximately three days after the incidents. 81 The supreme court also
observed that the children's close relationship with the defendant may have discouraged immediate complaint. 82 Quoting from People v. Ortega,83 a Colorado
Court of Appeals case, the court reasoned that the trustworthiness of statements
was based on the " ' lack of capacity to fabricate rather than the lack of time to
fabricate.' ",84 For these reasons, the court held that the grandmother's testimony was properly admitted as an excited utterance under Rule 803(2).85
The State did not argue that the testimony of the Rape Task Force volunteers was admissible as an excited utterance, but did contend that it qualified as
86
substantive evidence under Rule 803(24), the residual or "catch-all" exception.
In examining this argument, the court outlined the procedure that the trial judge
must follow before hearsay evidence can be admitted pursuant to this exception.
After notification that the statement is being offered for admission under Rule
803(24), the trial judge must state in the record that admissibility is being con77. Id. at 418, 329 N.W.2d at 266.
78. Id. at 421, 329 N.W.2d at 267.
79. Id.
80. Smith, 315 N.C. at 88, 337 S.E.2d at 842.
81. Id. Before relating the incident to her grandmother, the younger child in Smith stated: "I
have something to tell you.... I want you to come in the room. I am scared.... I want to tell you
what Sylvester done [sic] to me." Id. at 90, 337 S.E.2d at 843.
82. Id. at 89, 337 S.E.2d at 842.
83. 672 P.2d 215 (Colo. App. 1983).
84. Smith, 315 N.C. at 88, 337 S.E.2d at 842 (quoting Ortega, 672 P.2d at 218).
85. Id. at 90, 337 S.E.2d at 843.
86. N.C.R. EvID. 803(24) states:
Other Exceptions.-A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (1) the statement is
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these
rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it gives written notice stating his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant, to the adverse party sufficiently
in advance of offering the statement to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
prepare to meet the statement.
The North Carolina residual exception differs from the federal residual exception in that, under
the federal rule, notice does not have to be written and must be given "sufficiently in advance of the
trial or hearing." FED. R. EVID. 803(24).
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sidered pursuant to the exception.8 7 The trial judge must then engage in a six-

part inquiry with respect to notice, other specific exceptions, trustworthiness,
materiality, probativeness, and the interests ofjustice.8 8 The findings of the trial
judge must be stated explicitly in the record and inquiry must cease whenever
any of the six requirements are not met.89 The court concluded that "this
thoughtful analysis will greatly aid in assuring that only necessary, probative,
material, and trustworthy hearsay evidence will be admitted under this residual
exception9' o and will provide a sound framework for meaningful appellate
review.
Applying this rule to the testimony of the Rape Task Force volunteers, the

court found that the record had not been developed sufficiently to support the
admission of the testimony under Rule 803(24). 91 Therefore, the court held that

the portion of the testimony that did not corroborate the children's testimony
was inadmissable hearsay. 92 Furthermore, the court concluded that the testimony pertaining to the charge of first-degree sexual offense involving the
younger child was highly prejudicial to defendant and therefore the court
93
granted a new trial on that charge.
In a case decided after Smith, the supreme court again addressed the admis-

sibility of a child's out-of-court statements under the residual exception. In
State v. Fearing94 the court held that statements had been erroneously admitted
under Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) 95 because the competency of the child victim

to testify had not been properly determined. Under North Carolina law, there is
no age at which children are automatically excluded from testifying. 96 The de87. Smith, 315 N.C. at 92, 337 S.E.2d at 844.
88. Id. First, the trial judge must determine whether proper notice has been given and include
that determination in the record. Id. Second, because N.C.R. EVID. 803(24) refers to "[a]
statement
not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions," the trial judge must determine whether
the other specific exceptions apply and enter his or her conclusion in the record. Smith, 315 N.C. at
93, 337 S.E.2d at 844. Third, the trial judge must determine whether the statement has "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to those required for admission under the enumerated
exceptions." Id. at 93, 337 S.E.2d at 844. The trial judge is to base the determination on such
factors as whether the declarant had personal knowledge, was motivated to tell the truth, had recanted the statement, and was available for cross-examination. Id. at 93-94, 337 S.E.2d at 844-45.
In making this determination, the trial judge must include both the conclusion and reasoning in the
record. Id. at 94, 337 S.E.2d at 845. Fourth, the trial judge must determine whether the statement
"is offered as evidence of a material fact" and include a statement to that effect in the record. Id. at
94-95, 337 S.E.2d at 845-46. Fifth, the trial judge must inquire whether the statement "'is more
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can
secure through reasonable efforts.'" Id. at 95, 337 S.E.2d at 846 (quoting N.C.R. EvID.
803(24)(B)). Both findings of fact and conclusions of law must be stated in the record. Id. at 96, 337
S.E.2d at 846. Last, the trial judge must determine whether admission would best serve the interests
ofjustice. Id. The record must include the trial judge's analysis, but detailed findings of facts are not
necessary. Id. at 96, 337 S.E.2d at 847.
89. Id. at 92-96, 337 S.E.2d at 844-46.
90. Id. at 97, 337 S.E.2d at 847.
91. Id. at 98, 337 S.E.2d at 848.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 99, 337 S.E.2d at 848.
94. 315 N.C. 167, 337 S.E.2d 551 (1985).
95. N.C.R. EVID. 804(b)(5) applies when the declarant is unavailable as a witness. The language is identical to N.C.R. EVID. 803(24).
96. State v. Jones, 310 N.C. 716, 722, 314 S.E.2d 529, 533 (1984). The test is whether the
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termination of competency is left to the sound discretion of the trial court based
on personal examination of the child at a voir dire hearing. 97 The trial judge in
Fearing,however, had not conducted98 a voir dire examination, but rather had
relied on the stipulations of counsel.
The child's statements were admitted under the medical diagnosis and
residual exceptions, after the trial judge engaged in an inquiry similar to that
established in Smith. 99 Although hearsay evidence is allowed under Rule 803
whether or not the declarant is available as a witness, the Fearingcourt reasoned
that availability was nevertheless relevant because of the "more probative" requirement in Rule 803(24).100 The court stated that, if the child is able to testify, the need for the child's out-of-court declarations "very often is greatly
diminished if not obviated altogether."' 0 1 In Smith the court noted that
"[u]sually, but not always, the live testimony of the declarant will be the more (if
not the most) probative evidence,"10 2 but added that "the presence of the declar03
ant in the courthouse does not necessarily preclude a finding of necessity.'
Thus Fearingand Smith suggest that although the availability of a child victim
to testify does not preclude the use of residual hearsay under Rule 803(24), the
requirement of probativeness will be difficult to satisfy.
Courts in other jurisdictions are divided on the admissibility of hearsay
statements of a child victim of sexual abuse under the residual exception.'04 In
State v. Brown'0 5 the Iowa Supreme Court held that a child's statements to a
police officer identifying his assailant were inadmissible under the residual exception when the child was incompetent to testify. 10 6 In In re G.P.10 7 the Wyoming Supreme Court refused to admit a child's statements to a social worker
under the residual exception when there was no corroborative evidence and the
child testified that she did not recall the conversation.' 0 8 Conversely, in D.A.H.
v. G.A.H. 10 9 the Minnesota Court of Appeals admitted a child's declarations to a
witness understands the obligation of an oath and can relate facts that will assist the jury in reaching
its decision. Id.
97. Fearing, 315 N.C. at 174, 337 S.E.2d at 555.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 171, 337 S.E.2d at 554.
100. Id. The court quoted N.C.R. EVID. 803(24)(B), which requires that the statement be
"more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent
can procure through reasonable efforts." Fearing, 315 N.C. at 171, 337 S.E.2d at 554.
101. Fearing, 315 N.C. at 172, 337 S.E.2d at 554.
102. Smith, 315 N.C. at 95, 337 S.E.2d at 846.
103. Id. at 95 n.8, 337 S.E.2d at 846 n.8.
104. Several courts have held a child's hearsay statements admissible under the residual exception. See D.A.H. v. G.A.H., 371 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. App. 1985); In re M.N.D. v. B.M.D., 356
N.W.2d 813 (Minn. App. 1984); State v. Hollywood, 67 Or. App. 546, 680 P.2d 655 (1984); see also
W.C.L., Jr. v. People, 685 P.2d 176 (Colo. 1984) (en banc) (dictum that statements would have been
admissible under residual exception had it been adopted by Colorado). Other courts have refused to
admit a child's statements as residual hearsay. See State v. Brown, 341 N.W.2d 10 (Iowa 1983); In
re G.P., 679 P.2d 976 (Wyo. 1984).
105. 341 N.W.2d 10 (Iowa 1983).
106. Id. at 15.
107. 679 P.2d 976 (Wyo. 1984).
108. Id. at 1000.
109. 371 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. App. 1985).
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psychologist pursuant to the residual exception when the child did not testify,

based on a child hearsay statute that became effective after the trial. 110 The

Oregon Court of Appeals, in State v. Hollywood,' also found a child's hearsay
statements admissible under the residual
exception, after determining that they
1 12
did not qualify as excited utterances.
Some commentators, however, question whether the existing hearsay exceptions provide a satisfactory solution to the evidentiary problems presented in
child sexual abuse cases. 113 Admitting statements that identify an assailant or
that are made many hours or days after the event under the medical diagnosis or
treatment and excited utterance exceptions is accomplished by judicial "torturing" that stretches the exceptions far beyond their intended scope.

14

Court

rulings become difficult to predict because it is uncertain to what extent a court
might stretch these exceptions to accommodate a child's hearsay statements. 115

Furthermore, the exceptions could be enlarged to encompass other types of
117
cases, 1 16 such as sexual abuse cases not involving children.

The residual exception appears to offer a more viable alternative,118 but it
also has disadvantages. The requirement of probativeness makes it difficult to

admit a child's hearsay statements pursuant to the residual exception when the
child is available as a witness.1 19 Moreover, the residual exception was not in-

tended to be used routinely, but "very rarely, and only in exceptional
circumstances."

120

A better solution may be the creation of a special hearsay exception. At

least eleven states since 1982 have adopted statutes specifically making admissible the hearsay statements of child victims of sexual abuse. 12 1 Most statutes
require that the child either testify or be unavailable, and that the statement be
110. Id. at 3-4.
111. 67 Or. App. 546, 680 P.2d 655 (1984).
112. Id. at 550-50, 680 P.2d at 658.
113. See generally ABA RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 7, at 35-36 (proposal for admitting a
child's statements of sexual abuse); Bulldey, Evidentiary Theories for Admitting a Child's Out-ofCourt Statement ofSexualAbuse at Trial, in CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE LAW, supra note 14,
at 153 (review of theories under which a child's statements of sexual abuse have been admitted).
114. ABA RECOMMENDATIONS, supranote 7, at 35; Bulkley, supranote 113, at 161; Note, The
Sexually Abused Infant Hearsay Exception: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 8 JOURNAL OF JUVENILE
LAv 59, 68 (1984). See W.C.L., Jr. v. People, 685 P.2d 176, 182 (Colo. 1984) ("[W]e face distorting
or expanding our exceptions to the hearsay rule in a manner inconsistent with the text of the rules
and the rationales justifying them, or excluding otherwise trustworthy hearsay evidence which may
make it impossible to best serve the interests ofjustice."); Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721, 728 (Wyo.
1983) (Brown, J. dissenting) (admitting identity of assailant under medical diagnosis or treatment
exception "results in expanding, stretching and distorting the rule"), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1253
(1984).
115. Peterson, Sexual Abuse of Children-Washington'sNew HearsayException, 58 WASH. L.
REv. 813, 819-20 (1983).
116. Id. at 819.
117. The News and Observer, Raleigh, N.C., Jan.13, 1986, at IC, col. 1.
118. See ABA RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 7, at 35.
119. Skoler, New Hearsay Exceptionsfor a Child's Statement of Sexual Abuse, 18 J. MAR, L.
REV. 1, 8 (1984); see supra text accompanying notes 100-103.
120. S.REP. No. 93-1277, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 7051, 7066.
121. Special child hearsay exceptions have been adopted by Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana,
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reliable. 122 Constitutional challenges to these statutes may be anticipated, particularly when the child is available to testify. 123 However, because reliability is
also required, these statutes would seem to satisfy the standards set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts' 24 for protecting the accused's
1 25
sixth amendment confrontation right.
The adoption of special hearsay statutes for child sexual abuse cases would
have several advantages. First, there would be no need for courts to stretch
existing hearsay exceptions beyond their proper scope. For example, "spontaneity" would not be required to admit statements made hours or days after the
event, if other factors established reliability. 126 Second, statements would be
more likely to be admitted under the special statutes than under the residual
exception, because the new exceptions do not require the statements to be more
probative than other evidence. 127 Third, because special statutes specifically apply to child victims of sexual abuse, there is not the same potential for an expansive application of hearsay exceptions generally. 128
In conclusion, the approach taken by the Smith court offers one solution to
the evidentiary problems presented in child sexual abuse cases. The Smith court
has broadly construed the existing hearsay exceptions so that a child's out-ofcourt statements of sexual abuse can more easily be admitted. It is probable that
the number of prosecutions and convictions in child sexual abuse cases will increase as a result. This result, however, might better be achieved by a special
child victim hearsay statute. The North Carolina General Assembly should
consider the adoption of such a statute.
SUSAN

K. DATESMAN

Iowa (Juvenile Court only), Kansas, Minnesota, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Washington.
Bulkley, supra note 15, at 667.
122. Bulkley, supra note 15, at 650. For discussions of specific statutes, see Note, Minnesota's
Hearsay Exceptionfor Child Victims ofSexual Abuse, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REy. 799 (1985); Peterson, supra note 115, at 825-29 (discussion of Washington statute).
123. See Peterson, supra note 115, at 820-29; Skoler, supra note 119, at 14-38; Note, supra note
114, at 68-73; Note, supra note 122, at 812-820.
124. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
125. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall.., be confronted with the witnesses against
him; .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. When the declarant is unavailable, hearsay can be admitted
only if it has "adequate 'indicia of reliability.' Reliability can be inferred without more in a case in
which the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must
be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Roberts, 448
U.S. at 66.
126. See supra note 60.
127. See supra notes 100-103, 119 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 114-115 and accompanying text.

State v. Stafford: Rape Trauma Syndrome and the Admissibility
of Statements Made By Rape Victims
It is a tragic fact many adolescent children in America have been sexually
abused by a family member.I These adolescents not only deal with the trauma
of the event itself, but they must also face the dilemma of whether to report the

rape. Fearing they might cause a family crisis and alienate themselves from the
other family members, the victims often do not report the incident until weeks
or months after it occurs. 2 By this time little of the physical evidence 3 remains,
and other than the testimony of the child, only evidence of the child's psycholog-

ical and physiological suffering is available to prove the rape.
The prosecution faces two major problems in trying to present evidence of
the child's psychological and physiological suffering to the jury. First, many of
the statements the victim made to others concerning pain and suffering are not

admissible into evidence.4 Second, there is some controversy over whether expert medical testimony concerning post-rape suffering-rape trauma syndrome 5-is admissible at all6 As a result, the prosecution may have a difficult
time presenting expert testimony that includes statements made to the expert by
the alleged victim regarding her post-rape suffering.
In State v. Stafford 7 the North Carolina Court of Appeals discussed for the

first time whether a doctor in a criminal trial could testify to statements made by
an alleged rape victim during an examination. The alleged victim in Stafford,
Tammy Ingram, was a fourteen year-old girl who had accused her uncle of
1. According to one source, one in six girls are victims of incest by the age of eighteen.
Adams-Tucker, Early Treatment of Child Incest Victims, 38 AM. 1. oF PSYCHOTHERAPY 505, 508
(1984). The National Center of Child Abuse and Negligence reports over 100,000 cases of incest per
year. R. KEMPE & C. KEMPE, THE COMMON SECRET: SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 14(1984). Another study estimates that over 250,000 cases of incest occur each year. Id.
The majority of cases of incest go unreported. Ida
2. See, eg., State v. Kim, 64 Hawaii 598, 645 P.2d 1330 (1982) (victim waited nine days before
seeking an examination); State v. Hebert, 480 A.2d 742 (Me. 1984) (victim waited at least one month
before seeking an examination); Commonwealth v. Stago, 267 Pa. Super. 90, 406 A.2d 533 (1979)
(victim waited six months before telling anyone).
3. Physical evidence includes cuts, bruises to the face and body, odors, and sperm and seminal
fluid found in the victim's vagina or on the victim's undergarments. See, eg., People v. Bledsoe, 36
Cal. 3d 326, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1984)
(en bane).
4. Hearsay, defined in N.C.R. EVID. 801(c) as "a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted," is not admissible except as provided by statute or rule. N.C.R. EVID. 802.
5. Rape trauma syndrome is "the acute phase and long-term reorganization process that occurs as a result of forcible rape or attempted forcible rape." Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape Trauma
Syndrome, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 981, 982 (1974), reprintedin THE RAPE VICTIM 119 (D. Nass
ed. 1977).
6. See Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and Its Implicationsfor Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REv. 395, 436-53 (1985);
Comment, Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome: Admissibility and Effective Use in Criminal Prosecution, 33 AM. U.L. REv. 417, 417-20, 456-61 (1984); Note, Checking the Allure oflncreased Conviction Rates: The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome In
CriminalProceedings,70 VA. L. REV. 1657, 1691-93 (1984).
7. 77 N.C. App. 19, 334 S.E.2d 799 (1985).
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rape.8 She testified at trial that the incident occurred on December 9, 1983,
while she was spending the night at her aunt and uncle's home. 9 However,
Tammy did not tell anyone about the rape until January 11, 1984.10 The day
after Tammy reported the rape, Dr. Ponzi, a pediatrician, examined her.11 Dr.
Ponzi saw Tammy again on July 13, 1984.12
In his testimony, Dr. Ponzi described rape trauma syndrome as a list of
symptoms exhibited by rape victims that includes "musculoskeletal complaints,
headaches, vomiting, weight loss, . . . and emotional turmoil."' 13 He stated that
adolescent victims often feel depressed, labile, guilty, and anxious. 14 Dr. Ponzi
testified that Tammy told him on July 13, 1984, that she had lost fifteen pounds
between December and February, that she had experienced vomiting, crying,
and nightmares about the rape, that she was emotionally labile, and that the
quality of her school performance had declined. 15
The trial court convicted the defendant of second degree rape. 16 The North
Carolina Court of Appeals, however, held that the trial court had erred in admitting Dr. Ponzi's testimony because it was hearsay 17 and not admissible under
North Carolina Rule of Evidence 803(4), the exception to the hearsay rule for
statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment. 18 Thus, the
court did not reach the broader, more controversial question whether expert
testimony concerning rape trauma syndrome is admissible in North Carolina to
prove forcible rape. Judge Becton, in a concurring opinion, addressed this question and concluded that rape trauma syndrome testimony should not be admissible. 19 Judge Martin argued in dissent that the testimony satisfied the
requirements of rule 803(4) and that expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome
should be admissible.20 This Note examines the language of rule 803(4), the
rule's application in other jurisdictions, and the arguments for and against ad8. Id. at 19, 334 S.E.2d at 800.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 19-20, 334 S.E.2d at 800.
Id. at 20, 334 S.E.2d at 800.
Id.

14. Id.
15. Id.

16. Id.
17. See supra note 4.
18. Stafford, 77 N.C. App. at 21, 334 S.E.2d at 801. The court of appeals ordered a new trial.
Id. For the text of rule 803(4), see text accompanying note 24.
19. Stafford, 77 N.C. App. at 22-24, 334 S.E.2d at 801-02 (Becton, J., concurring). Judge Becton gave four reasons why Dr. Ponzi's testimony concerning rape trauma syndrome was unduly

prejudicial. First, rape trauma syndrome has not gained general acceptance as a reliable means of
concurring). Second, there was no testimony
proving rape. Id. at 22, 334 S.E.2d at 801 (Becton, J.,
about the reliability of the rape trauma syndrome evidence presented. Id. at 23, 334 S.E.2d at 802
(Becton, J., concurring). Third, rape trauma syndrome historically was never intended to prove
rape. Id. Last, defendant did not raise the defense of "consent." Id.
dissenting). Judge Martin argued that the
20. Id. at 24-27, 334 S.E.2d at 802-04 (Martin, J.,
majority interpreted rule 803(4) too narrowly. He proposed the following test to determine the
admissibility of a declarant's out of court statement: "[Is the declarant motivated to tell the truth
because diagnosis or treatment depends on what she says; and is it reasonable for the physician... to
rely on this information in diagnosis or treatment." Id. at 25, 334 S.E.2d at 802-03 (Martin, J.,
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mitting evidence of rape trauma syndrome. It concludes that the court of ap-

peals interpreted rule 803(4) narrowly to avoid the question whether evidence of
rape trauma syndrome should be admissible. If the court had reached that issue,

it should have held Dr. Ponzi's testimony concerning rape trauma syndrome
admissible.

North Carolina Rule of Evidence 801(c) provides that "hearsay" is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while at trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."'' z Dr. Ponzi's testimony was

clearly hearsay. It repeated the symptoms described to him by Tammy Ingram
during his examination of her on July 13, 1984. As a general rule, hearsay is not
admissible. 22 However, North Carolina Rule of Evidence 803 sets forth several
exceptions, 23 including rule 803(4), which applies to "[s]tatements made for pur-

poses of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past
or present symptoms, pain, or sensations... insofar as reasonably pertinent to

diagnosis or treatment." '24 Thus, the issue in Stafford was whether Tammy Ingram made the statements to Dr. Ponzi for the purpose of diagnosis or

treatment.
Prior to the adoption of the Evidence Code in 1983,25 North Carolina had a
hearsay exception similar to, but narrower than, rule 803(4). The North Carolina Supreme Court first articulated the exception in 1957 when it held that
opinion testimony of a physician was admissible despite the physician's reliance
"on statements made to him by the patient, if those statements [were] made...
in the course of professional treatment and with a view of effecting a cure, or

during an examination made for the purpose of treatment or cure." 2 6 In a later
dissenting). Judge Martin found that Tammy Ingram's out of court statements to Dr. Ponzi met this
test and thus were admissible under rule 803(4). Id. at 25, 334 S.E.2d at 803 (Martin, J., dissenting).
Judge Martin also asserted that Dr. Ponzi's testimony concerning the symptoms comprising
rape trauma syndrome was relevant and admissible, noting that the court accepted Dr. Ponzi as an
expert witness and that Dr. Ponzi never expressed an opinion as to whether Tammy Ingram in fact
suffered from rape trauma syndrome. Id. He further stated that jurors have no common knowledge
of the reactions of rape victims and that expert testimony about rape trauma syndrome would help
the jury understand the evidence and draw an appropriate conclusion. Id. at 26, 334 S.E.2d at 803.
21. N.C.R. EVID. 801(C).
22. N.C.R EvID. 802 states that "h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by statute or
by these rules."
23. N.C.Rt EVID. 803(1)-(24).
24. N.C.R. EVID. 803(4). For examples of applications of rule 803(4) to doctors' testimonies of
rape victims' statements, see United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 83-85 (8th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981); State v. Hebert, 480 A.2d 742, 748-49 (Me. 1984). The commentary to
rule 803(4) advises that the words "reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment" are broad
enough to cover statements concerning the cause of an injury but not statements of fault. N.C.R.
EvID. 803(4) commentary.
25. In 1983 the North Carolina General Assembly enacted the North Carolina Evidence Code.
Act of July 7, 1983, ch. 701, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 666 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 (Supp.
1985)). Many of the provisions in the North Carolina Evidence Code are identical to or substantially similar to provisions in the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Crumpler & Widenhouse, An
Analysis of the New North CarolinaEvidence Code: Opportunity ForReform, 20 WAKE FORST L.
REv.1, 3-4 (1984).
26. Penland v. Bird Coal Co., 246 N.C. 26, 31, 97 S.E.2d 432, 436 (1957) (expert testimony in a
worker's compensation case). According to Professor Blakey, Penland was the first time the North
Carolina Supreme Court had been called on to decide this question. Blakey, Examinationof Expert
Witnesses in North Carolina, 61 N.C.L. REV. 2, 22 & n.l 18 (1982).
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case the court stated that it is reasonable to assume that the patient's statements
under these circumstances will be truthful because of the patient's self-interest in
his or her health.27 However, when a doctor examines a patient for the sole
purpose of testifying as a witness, the patient lacks this motive to tell the truth.
Therefore, statements by the patient during such an examination are inadmissible hearsay. 28 The rule evolved into a two-part test, which the supreme court
stated in 1979 in State v. Wade :29
(1) A physician, as an expert witness, may give his opinion, including
a diagnosis, based either on personal knowledge or observation or on
information supplied him by others, including the patient if such information is inherently reliable even though it is not independently admissible into evidence. The opinion, of course, may be based on
information gained in both ways.
(2) If his opinion is admissible the expert may testify to the information he relied30 on in forming it for the purpose of showing the basis of
the opinion.
The court in Wade held the patient's statements to be reliable because he was
sent to the doctor as a patient for treatment and he received a thorough examination. 3 1 Thus, under North Carolina law prior to 1983 the doctor could not
testify to the symptoms the patient related unless the doctor had both examined
the patient for purposes of treatment and had used the patient's statements as
part of the basis of the expert opinion.
North Carolina's adoption of rule 803(4), however, expanded this hearsay
exception by eliminating two of the hurdles of the Wade test. First, the rule
does not require that the patient seek treatment from the doctor. Rather, it
specifically includes statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or
treatment. 32 Second, the rule rejects the distinction that a doctor could repeat a
patient's statements regarding past symptoms or medical history only for the
purpose of explaining the basis of his or her opinion and not for the purpose of
proving the truth of the out-of-court statements. 33 These two changes are consistent with the Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which indicate the drafters' intent to liberalize the common-law standards for
the admissibility of statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or
27. State v. Bock, 288 N.C. 145, 163, 217 S.E.2d 513, 524 (1975) (expert testimony in a murder
case), vacated in part, 428 U.S. 903 (1976) (death penalty held unconstitutional).
28. Id.
29. 296 N.C. 454, 251 S.E.2d 407 (1979) (expert testimony in a murder case).
30. Id. at 462, 251 S.E.2d at 412. The Wade test became known as the "inherently reliable"
test. See Blakey, supra note 26, at 26. In subsequent cases the court interpreted "inherently reliable" to mean "'reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field.' "Id.
31. Wade, 296 N.C. at 462-63, 251 S.E.2d at 412.
32. N.C.R. EvID. 803(4) (emphasis added).
33. See United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 83 n.8 (8th Cir. 1980). In interpreting rule
803(4), the court noted:
Some courts had also held that a physician could repeat a patient's statement regarding
medical history or past symptoms for the limited purpose of explaining the basis of an
opinion and not in order to prove the truth of the out-of-court declarations. This distinc-

tion was likewise rejected by the federal rules.
Id. (citing FEo. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee note).
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treatment. 34
Application of rule 803(4) by other courts demonstrates how the rule liberalized the common-law standards. In United States v. Iron Shell35 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated that "the rule abolished the
distinction between the doctor who is consulted for the purpose of treatment and
an examination for the purpose of diagnosis only; the latter usually refers to a
doctor who is consulted only in order to testify as a witness."'36 This reasoning
also was applied by the same court in United States v. Iron Thunder.37 In Iron
Thunder the doctor examined defendant "pursuant to a standardized protocol
designed in large measure to prepare for criminal prosecution."' 38 The court
held the patient's statements informing the doctor of the patient's physical,
mental, and emotional condition were admissible even though no treatment was
contemplated or given.3 9 Emphasizing that the statements could have served as
a basis for treatment, the court stated that the fact "no treatment was contem'40
plated or given does not prevent application of the Rule 803(4) exception."
In State v. Hebert,4 1 a Maine case that closely parallels Stafford,42 defendant argued that because the alleged victim had the physical examination "'to
gather evidence for use in a criminal prosecution,'" the statement "'that there
had been sexual activity with an adult'" was not made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment. 43 The Maine Supreme Court found that the examination was conducted to discover any physical damage or evidence of sexual
abuse and concluded that the purpose of the examination was to make a medical
diagnosis. 44 Holding the doctor's testimony regarding the patient's statement to
be admissible, the court reasoned that "[t]he statement made for purposes of the
diagnosis did not lose its inherent trustworthy nature merely because the [patient] might have been aware criminal proceedings might be instituted. '45 Thus,
the critical factor in deciding whether to admit statements made to an examining
physician is the patient's motive for giving the information. If the patient gives
34. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee note. The note explains that:
Conventional doctrine has excluded from the hearsay exception, as not within its
guarantee of truthfulness, statements to a physician consulted only for the purpose of enabling him to testify. While these statements were not admissible as substantive evidence,
the expert was allowed to state the basis of his opinion, including statements of this kind.
The distinction thus called for was one most unlikely to be made by juries. The rule accordingly rejects the limitation.

Id.
35. 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980).
36. Id. at 83.
37. 714 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1983).
38. Id. at 772.
39. Id. at 772-73.
40. Id. at 773.
41. 480 A.2d 742 (Me. 1984).
42. In Hebert a thirteen year-old girl accused her father of sexually assaulting her between
January and August of 1980. Id. at 745. The doctor who testified at trial had examined the girl in
September 1980 after the mother became aware of the alleged sexual activity. Id. at 746.
43. Id. at 748.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 749.
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the information to aid in diagnosis or treatment, it is assumed that the statements are trustworthy. 46 Therefore, if a patient visits a doctor for the dual purposes of receiving treatment or diagnosis and having the doctor testify at trial,
statements made to the doctor that are reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or
treatment should be admissible. 47
Dr. Ponzi's testimony would not be admissible under the Wade test because
he did not use the patient's statements as the basis of his opinion. 4 8 However, it
should be admissible under rule 803(4) because the rule eliminates this requirement. 49 Accordingly, the court of appeals did not base its decision on this factor. Instead, it held Dr. Ponzi's testimony inadmissible because "[i]t was
obvious that Tammy... went to Dr. Ponzi in preparation for going to court." 50
As the dissent noted, however, nothing in the record indicated that she visited
51
Dr. Ponzi solely in preparation for Dr. Ponzi's court testimony.
Dr. Ponzi examined Tammy the day after she told her mother about the
46. United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252, 289 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
47. See supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
According to the Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence, even if the
patient consulted the physician solely for the purpose of having the physician testify at trial, statements made by the patient to the physician are admissible as substantive evidence as long as they are
of a type reasonably relied on by physicians in treating the patient or making a diagnosis. See FED.
R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee note. Such evidence would be admissible anyway under FED.
R. EviD. 703, not as substantive evidence, but for the limited purpose of showing the basis of the
expert's opinion. Id. The rationale for admitting the patient's statements as substantive evidence is
that the jury, despite having received limiting instructions from the judge, tends to treat the evidence
admitted under rule 703 as substantive evidence. Id. However, if the patient visits the physician
solely for the purpose of having the physician testify at trial, the patient will lack the motivation to
tell the truth that he or she would otherwise have. That is, the patient's health does not depend on
the statements made to the doctor. Thus, the patient will have a motivation to lie by making selfserving statements that will help his or her case. Therefore, admitting such testimony would undermine the theory behind rule 803, that "under appropriate circumstances a hearsay statement may
possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the declarant in person at the trial .... " FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee note.
48. See Stafford, 77 N.C. App. at 20, 334 S.E.2d at 800. In fact, Dr. Ponzi testified at the voir
dire hearing that he could not form an opinion whether Tammy Ingram had rape trauma syndrome.

Id.
49. Because rule 803(4) of the North Carolina Evidence Code is identical to the federal rule, it
can be presumed that they have the same meaning. However, in State v. Spangler the supreme court
cast doubt on this presumption by stating in a footnote that rule 803(4) codifies the Wade test. State
v. Spangler, 314 N.C. 374, 385 n.1, 333 S.E.2d 722, 729 n.1 (1985). The court, however, did not
decide whether rule 803(4) changed the common-law rule of admissibility of statements made to a
doctor. Rather, the issue in Spangler was whether the trial court committed reversible error in
allowing a doctor to testify about results of tests that were administered by staff psychologists, not by
the doctor. Id. at 385, 333 S.E.2d at 729. The court applied the Wade test, which admits evidence
that is "inherently reliable," in holding that the testimony was properly admissible. Id. See supra
note 30 and accompanying text. Therefore, it appears that the court was not actually applying rule
803(4) but was applying rule 703, which provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
N.C.R. EVID. 703.
Because rule 803(4) is the current law in North Carolina, prior case law should apply only to
the extent that it is consistent with the statutory language of rule 803(4).
50. Stafford, 77 N.C. App. at 21, 334 S.E.2d at 801.
51. Id. at 25, 334 S.E.2d at 803 (Martin, 3., dissenting).
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incident and again six months later.52 The trial did not commence until over a
year after this second examination.5 3 Thus, Stafford is clearly distinguishable
from prior North Carolina cases in which the court excluded the testimony because the doctor examined the patient one or two days before the trial.5 4 Unlike

these cases, in which the doctor obviously was consulted solely for the purpose
of testifying at trial, Tammy and her mother consulted Dr. Ponzi to inquire
55
about Tammy's health and to obtain a diagnosis.

Although the court correctly concluded that Tammy did not go to Dr.
Ponzi for the purpose of treatment, the court also asserted that "we do not believe we should hold she went for diagnosis."

56

As the dissent argued, however,

Tammy's statements about her physical and emotional well-being did assist Dr.
Ponzi in making a diagnosis.5 7 These statements should not have been rendered
inadmissible because Tammy may have been aware of the pending trial.5 8 If the
declarant's statements were motivated by a desire to assist medical diagnosis, the
evidence is admissible even if the patient consults the physician for the purpose
59
of testifying at trial.

The Stafford court justified its holding by stating that "the diagnosis for
which the exception to the hearsay rule applies should be a diagnosis for the
purpose of treatinga disease."' 60 However, the court cited no authority and gave

no policy justification for this narrow interpretation of rule 803(4); a rule intended to broaden the common-law hearsay exception. 6 1 The court of appeals

may have construed the rule narrowly to avoid the more difficult and controversial question whether expert testimony concerning rape trauma syndrome
should be admissible to prove forcible rape.

The identification of rape trauma syndrome is a recent psychiatric develop52. Id. at 20, 334 S.E.2d at 800.
53. Id.
54. See, eg., State v. Bock, 288 N.C. 145, 217 S.E.2d 513 (1975) (doctor's testimony on
whether defendant was conscious of his acts when he inflicted the wounds, based on examination
two days before trial, held inadmissible); Ward v. Wentz, 20 N.C. App. 229, 201 S.E.2d 194 (1973)
(doctor's prognosis as to permanency of plaintiff's injuries based on examination the day before trial
held inadmissible).
55. As a concerned parent, Mrs. Ingram took her daughter to be examined the day after
Tammy told her about the rape and took her back to the doctor six months later because she had
been losing weight, vomiting, crying, and having nightmares. Stafford, 77 N.C. App. at 20, 334
S.E.2d at 800.
56. Id. at 21, 334 S.E.2d at 801.
57. Id. at 25, 334 S.E.2d at 803.
58. See State v. Hebert, 480 A.2d 742, 749 (Me. 1984). The court in Hebert stated that "[t]he
statement made for purposes of the diagnosis did not lose its inherently trustworthy nature merely
because the [patient] might have been aware criminal proceedings might be instituted." Id.
59. See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
60. Stafford, 77 N.C. App. at 21, 334 S.E.2d at 801 (emphasis added).
61. Apparently, no other court has so limited rule 803(4). Numerous courts, however, have
applied the rule to rape victims. See, eg., United States v. Iron Thunder, 714 F.2d 765 (8th Cir.
1983); United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199
(9th Cir. 1979); State v. Hebert, 480 A.2d 742 (Me. 1984); State v. McDaniel, 37 Wash. App. 768,
683 P.2d 231 (1984). Other courts have applied the rule to personal injury claimants. See, e.g., Britt
v. Corporacion Peruana de Vapores, 506 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1975); Washington v. National R.R.
Passenger Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1134 (D.D.C. 1979).

1986]

EVIDENCE

ment. 62 The term comes from a study conducted by Burgess and Holmstrom
from July 1972 to July 1973.63 Based on interviews and consultations with 146
alleged rape victims, the researchers concluded that these victims experienced a
two-phase group of symptoms, termed rape trauma syndrome, as a result of
forcible rape or attempted forcible rape.64 Phase I, the acute phase, occurs immediately after the rape and is characterized by extreme fear and anxiety, physical shock, and a wide range of emotional reactions. 65 Some women complained
of loss of appetite, nausea, and sleeping disorders.6 6 Phase II, the long-term
reorganization process, consists of rape-related phobic reactions, difficulties
maintaining close relationships, and nightmares. 67 Although subsequent studies68 are not completely consistent with the findings of the Burgess and Holm69
strom study, they do support the theory of the two-phase reaction to rape.
Rape trauma syndrome falls within the broad category of "post-traumatic
stress disorders" 7 0---disorders resulting from reactions to stressful events such
as wars, natural disasters, and manmade disasters.7 1 The psychiatric community generally recognizes the concept of post-traumatic stress disorder as shown
by the American Psychiatric Association's inclusion of post-traumatic stress dis72
order in its Diagnosticand StatisticalManual of Mental Disorders(DSM-III).
Although different crises may result in similar reactions,7 3 the symptoms resulting from each crisis are considered distinguishable.74 Many courts and commentators, however, perceive that the emotional and physical suffering
subsequent to rape cannot be distinguished from that following any other psychologically traumatic event.7 5 Partially as a result of this perception, courts
62. State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 654, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (1982).
63. See Massaro, supra note 6, at 424.
64. Burgess & Holmstrom, supra note 5, at 981-82. The researchers did not distinguish between victims of rape and victims of attempted rape. Burgess and Holmstrom defined rape trauma
syndrome as "the acute phase and long-term reorganization process that occurs as a result of forcible
rape or attempted forcible rape." Id. at 982.
65. Burgess & Holmstrom, supra note 5, at 981, 982-83.
66. Burgess & Holmstrom, supra note 5, at 981, 982-83.
67. Burgess & Holmstrom, supra note 5, at 983-84.
68. See Notman & Nadelson, The Rape Victim: Psychodynamic Considerations,in THE RAPE
VICTIM 131 (D. Nass ed. 1977); Sutherland & Scherl, PatternsofResponse Among Victims of Rape,
40 AM. J.ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 503 (1979).
69. See Massaro, supranote 6, at 427. Massaro states that "[n]umerous other writers who have
joined the research on the effect of rape on victims tend to corroborate Burgess and Holmstrom's
theory of RTS as a two-phase reaction to rape." Id. (footnotes omitted).
70. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF

MENTAL DISORDERS 236-39 (3d ed. 1980).
71. See Comment, supra note 6, at 424-25.
72. Comment, supra note 6, at 425. The DSM-III is the official book of mental disorders recognized by the American Psychiatric Association. Id.
73. Comment, supra note 6, at 425. These reactions include "recurrent nightmares, anxiety,
numbed responsiveness, impaired concentration, irritability, hypersensitivity, and depression." Id.
at 425 n.61 (citing Andreason, PosttraumaticStress Disorder,in 2 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY 1517, 1518 (3d ed. 1980)).
74. See Comment, supra note 6, at 425 & n.62 (citing Bassuk, A Crisis Theory Perspective on
Rape in THE RAPE CRISIS INTERVENTION HANDBOOK 121, 126-28 (S. McCombie ed. 1980)).
75. See, eg., State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 229-30 (Minn. 1982); Note, supra note 6, at
1695-99. According to one commentator, "the studies find that rape victims experience psychological reactions similar to victims of other crimes, or they find that [rape trauma syndrome] varies

1372

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

disagree on whether expert testimony regarding rape trauma syndrome should
76
be admissible.
Few courts have discussed the use of expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome in the courtroom.77 Only four state supreme courts have decided
whether rape trauma syndrome evidence is admissible in a criminal case.78 In
each case the court decided whether such evidence was admissible to prove lack

of consent to sexual intercourse. 79 Indeed, almost all of the cases and commentaries concerning the admissibility of rape trauma syndrome evidence discuss

whether such evidence should be admissible to prove lack of consent. There is a
strong argument, however, that there is an even greater need for rape trauma
syndrome evidence in cases in which children allegedly have been sexually
abused by family members because these cases do not involve the defense of

consent. 80 As in most consent cases, there are usually no witnesses to the incident. Unlike many of the victims in consent cases, however, the victims of intrafamily sexual abuse often do not report the rape until months after the incident,81 and thus, there is little or no physical evidence remaining.8 2 Because of

this lack of evidence, expert testimony that the alleged victim's symptoms are
consistent with those generally shown by rape victims should be admissible to

prove forcible rape.
Evidence of rape trauma syndrome must satisfy the statutory requirements
for admissibility. Like any other type of evidence, evidence of rape trauma syndrome must be relevant. 83 Rule 401 defines relevancy as "having any tendency

to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."'84 Relevant evidence, including expert testimony, "may be excluded if

its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
significantly from individual to individual, thus indicating that there is no syndrome unique to rape."
Id. at 1673.
76. See infra note 79.
77. People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 247, 681 P.2d 291, 298, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 457 (1984).
The court stated that "there have been relatively few cases which have addressed the question of the
use of expert testimony on the syndrome in a judicial setting." Id.
78. See People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984); State v.
Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292 (1982); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982); State
v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1984).
79. The Kansas Supreme Court has held that evidence of rape trauma syndrome is admissible
to prove lack of consent, see State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 653, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (1982), while
the supreme courts of California, Minnesota, and Missouri have held that such evidence is inadmissible, see People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 251, 681 P.2d 291, 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 460 (1984);
State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 240-41 (Mo.
1984).
80. In his concurring opinion, Judge Becton stated that one reason not to allow Dr. Ponzi's
testimony on rape trauma syndrome was because "defendant did not raise 'consent' as a defense."
Stafford, 77 N.C. App. at 23, 334 S.E.2d at 802 (Becton, J.,concurring). According to Judge Becton, "when a defendant does not contest the fact that a rape occurred,... rape trauma syndrome
evidence may be irrelevant and prejudicial." Id. This is true if the issue is one of misidentification.
See infra note 100. However, misidentification was not at issue in Stafford.
81. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
83. N.C.R. EVID. 401.
84. Id.
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undue
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
85
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."

Testimony on rape trauma syndrome also must satisfy the requirements for
admissibility of expert testimony. Under rule 702 the witness must be qualified

as an expert "by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education," and his or

her testimony must be useful to the jury. 86 Unlike the common-law rule, expert

testimony under rule 704 "is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate

of fact."'87 However, the testimony cannot be in
issue to be decided by the trier 88

the form of a legal conclusion.
Finally, evidence of rape trauma syndrome must satisfy the test for admissibility of novel scientific theories. Most jurisdictions apply the Frye test,8 9 which

requires that the theory be generally accepted by the relevant scientific community. 90 General acceptance can be shown by use of the theory in other cases, as

well as by discussion of it in law review articles and scientific journals. 91 Other

courts reject the Frye test and require only that the theory be reliable. 92 Of the
courts that have decided whether evidence of rape trauma syndrome should be
admissible, even those that cite Frye did not base their holdings exclusively on
whether rape trauma syndrome had gained general acceptance. Rather, they
based their decisions on whether the syndrome reliably determines whether a
the prejudicial effect of admitting the evidence
rape has occurred and whether
93
outweighs its probative value.

Courts refusing to admit evidence of rape trauma syndrome have criticized
the theory. One of the major criticisms is that rape trauma syndrome evidence is

not relevant because the syndrome cannot be distinguished from the reactions to
any other psychologically stressful event. 94 As a result, evidence of rape trauma
85. N.C.R. EVID. 403.
86. N.C.R. EVID. 702. The expert's testimony is helpful if it "will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Id.
87. N.C.R. EvID. 704.
88. The advisory committee note to Federal rule 704, which is identical to rule 704 of the
North Carolina Evidence Code, states that opinions which "merely tell the jury what result to
reach" should not be admissible. See FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee note. The danger is
that the expert's testimony will invade the province of the jury. See Comment, supra note 6, at 450.
89. See Massaro, supranote 6, at 434. The Frye test is derived from Frye v. United States, 293
F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The court in Frye held that the lie detector had not gained enough scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities to justify admitting testimony
about the results of a lie detector test. Id. at 1014.
90. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
91. See Massaro, supra note 6, at 434-35.
92. See Massaro, supra note 6, at 435. Although general acceptance is not required, whether
the theory has gained general acceptance can affect the weight of the testimony in those jurisdictions
rejecting the Frye test. Id.
93. See People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal.3d 236, 251, 681 P.2d 291, 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 460
(1984); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 240
(Mo. 1984).
94. See State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 229-30 (Minn. 1982). The Minnesota Supreme
Court stated that:
Rape trauma symdrome [sic] is not the type of scientific test that accurately and reliably
determines whether a rape has occurred. The characteristic symptoms may follow any
psychologically traumatic event.... At best, the syndrome describes only symptoms that
occur with some frequency, but makes no pretense of describing every single case.
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syndrome does not prove that a rape occurred; it only shows that something

traumatic happened to the victim. 95 But as Judge Martin said in his dissent,
although rape trauma syndrome does not necessarily prove forcible rape, it does
have a tendency to prove that a rape occurred, which is all that is required under
rule 401.96 Although some of the symptoms of rape trauma syndrome cannot be

distinguished from reactions to other stressful events, other symptoms, such as
nightmares about the rape and fear of men are distinct. Furthermore, even if the

symptoms were identical, there is no reason to treat these "psychological
bruises" as any less relevant than physical bruises, 97 which are not specific to
rape victims, but have long been admissible as relevant to the issue of rape. 98
When a previously healthy fourteen year-old girl loses fifteen pounds in two
months, vomits, cries a great deal, appears emotionally labile, declines in school
performance, and has nightmares about rape, the logical inference is that some
traumatic event has occurred. Cross-examination of the expert and the victim
provides a means of ascertaining whether something other than the alleged rape
might have caused the physical or psychological injury.99 Furthermore, in a

case such as Stafford, in which physical evidence of rape is unavailable, evidence
of a victim's psychological and emotional responses may provide the only means

to prove that rape occurred. 1°)
Courts and commentators also have argued that evidence of rape trauma

syndrome does not help the jury because it does not increase jury knowledge.10 1
The Minnesota Supreme Court stated that "[t]he scientific evaluation of rape
trauma syndrome has not reached a level of reliability that surpasses the quality
of common sense evaluation present in jury deliberations" and that "evidence of
reactions of other people does not assist the jury in its fact-finding function."' 10 2
There is no indication, however, that jurors already know about the psychologi-

cal and emotional consequences of rape.10 3 In fact, jurors often have misconcep-

Id. (citing AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
236 (3d ed. 1980)); see supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
95. See Massaro, supra note 6, at 439-41.
96. Stafford, 77 N.C. App. at 26, 334 S.E.2d at 803 (Martin, J., dissenting). See Massaro, supra
note 6, at 439-41; see supra text accompanying notes 83-84.
97. See Massaro, supra note 6, at 440.
98. In his dissenting opinion in Stafford, Judge Martin stated that "[j]ust as evidence of physical injury has been admissible as relevant to the issue of rape, so should evidence of emotional injury
to the victim be relevant to show that it is more likely that a rape occurred." Stafford, 77 N.C. App.
at 26, 334 S.E.2d at 804 (Martin, J., dissenting).
99. See Comment, supra note 6, at 454-55.
100. See Comment, supra note 6, at 454-55. Two valid criticisms of the admissibility of rape
trauma syndrome evidence are that rape trauma syndrome does not distinguish between rape and
attempted rape and that rape trauma syndrome evidence does not assist the trier of fact in identifying the rapist. Id. at 448. Neither of these criticisms apply to the facts of Stafford. In their study
Burgess and Holmstrom did not distinguish between rape and attempted rape. Thus, if the defense is
that penetration did not occur, evidence of rape trauma syndrome should not be admitted. Id.
(citing Burgess & Holmstrom, supra note 5, at 982). Furthermore, if there is no question that a rape
occurred, but the defense is one of misidentification, evidence of rape trauma syndrome would have
no probative value because it is not relevant to the issue of identification. Id.
101. See, eg, State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982).
102. Id.
103. See Massaro, supra note 6, at 442. In State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215
(1983), 18 of the prospective jurors were asked whether they knew a child victim of sexual abuse or if
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tions about alleged rape victims. 1° 4 Evidence that a person has suffered
psychological injuries that are consistent with the symptoms shown by rape victims has a tendency to prove that a rape occurred and is thereforehelpful to the
jury, especially when there is little or no physical evidence available.
Another argument against admitting evidence of rape trauma syndrome is
that the syndrome is unreliable because it is not intended to prove that a rape
actually occurred. 10 5 Unlike lie detector tests or fingerprints, "rape trauma syndrome was not devised to determine the 'truth' or 'accuracy' of a particular past
event-i.e., whether, in fact, a rape occurred-but rather was developed by professional rape counselors as a therapeutic tool .... -106 The counselors do not
probe inconsistencies in clients' statements and avoid making judgments as to
the credibility of clients. 10 7 Consequently, some women who were never raped
might be diagnosed as having rape trauma syndrome. Hence, the fact a woman
exhibits the symptoms of rape trauma syndrome does not necessarily prove that
she has in fact been raped. 10 8
Thus, the concern is that a woman could lie about the rape and fake the
post-rape symptoms. One commentator argues that this is an unfounded fear
for three reasons. First, a woman would have to do a great deal of research to
know precisely what symptoms to fake. 10 9 Second, even if a woman tried to
fake the symptoms, she would have to convince a qualified doctor that she had
rape trauma syndrome. 110 Last, "the victim and the expert would be available
in the courtroom where the ...defendant could attack the victim's credibility
... and the reliability of the theory.""'
Perhaps the main reason for not admitting evidence of rape trauma syndrome is the possibility that undue prejudice and jury confusion may outweigh
the probative value of the evidence. The Minnesota Supreme Court stated that
expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome "unfairly prejudices the [defendant]
by creating an aura of special reliability and trustworthiness." ' 1 2 This concern
is based on the assumption that the expert testimony would overwhelm the ju113
rors and prevent them from making a rational decision based on the facts.
they had heard of any children who had been sexually abused by a family member. Fifteen indicated
that they knew no such children. Id. at 436-37, 657 P.2d at 1220. The Oregon Supreme Court
noted that this lack of experience meant a lack of familiarity with the common occurrence of a child
reporting sexual abuse and then retracting the story. The court declared, "Such evidence might well
help a jury ... [evaluate] the credibility of a testifying child." Id.

104. See Comment, supra note 6, at 448-49. "Cultural myths that 'the victim liked it' or 'the
victim deserved it' are pervasive." Id. (citing Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape
Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 25 (1977)).
105. People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 249, 681 P.2d 291, 300, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 459 (1984)
(en bane).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 250, 681 P.2d at 300, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
108. See Massaro, supra note 6, at 448-49.
109. Massaro, supra note 6, at 449-50.
110. Massaro, supra note 6, at 450.
111. Massaro, supra note 6, at 450.
112. State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982).
113. See Note, supra note 6, at 1701. According to the student commentator, despite cautionary
instructions by the court, the danger of the "special aura of trustworthiness and reliability" of expert
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This assumption, however, may be erroneous for a number of reasons. First,
several studies show that expert testimony does not overwhelm a jury. 1 4 Second, the subjectivity inherent in the doctor's diagnosis of the syndrome should
be apparent to the jury.11 5 Third, rape trauma syndrome does not involve com1 16
plicated mechanical devices that the jury cannot understand and evaluate.
and the alleged victim protects
Last, the opportunity to cross-examine the1expert
17
against the possibility of undue prejudice.
The North Carolina Rules of Evidence provide that the judge should exclude relevant evidence only if the danger of unfair prejudice or jury confusion
substantially outweighs its probative value. 118 If the expert merely testifies to
the symptoms related by the patient and then states the symptoms constituting
rape trauma syndrome, there is unlikely to be any undue prejudice. Moreover, a
judge should be cautious in disallowing such testimony when there is no physical
evidence of the rape and when excluding the testimony would seriously damage
the prosecution's case.
Three of the four state supreme courts that have ruled on evidence of rape
trauma syndrome have held it inadmissible.1 19 Stafford, however, presents a
situation different from the ones presented to those courts. In each of those
cases, the expert stated or strongly suggested that the victim's symptoms of rape
trauma syndrome were in fact caused by rape.1 20 These courts held the testimony to be unduly prejudicial.1 2 1 Dr. Ponzi, however, made no such conclusion; he merely recited the patient's symptoms and described the symptoms
characteristic of rape trauma syndrome. 122 Therefore, it is likely that the courts
that held rape trauma syndrome evidence inadmissible would admit the expert
testimony given by Dr. Ponzi.
For example, the California Supreme Court stated that "nothing in this
opinion is intended to imply that evidence of the emotional and psychological
trauma that a complaining witness suffers after an alleged rape is inadmissible in
testimony unduly influencing the jury becomes especially significant when the testimony concerns a
dispositive issue in a rape case. Id.
114. See R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANrrY 169-70 (1967)); Massaro, supra
note 6, at 440 (citing H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 177 n,12 (1971).
115. See Comment, supra note 6, at 453.
116. Comment, supra note 6, at 453-54. Thus, evidence of rape trauma syndrome can be distinguished from evidence in which " 'highly subjective judgments... [are] based upon the data received
from sophisticated mechanical devices. In these circumstances, the apparent objectivity of the
machine may suggest a degree of certainty inconsistent with the subjective aspects of the enterprise.'" Id. at 454 n.302 (quoting Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 385, 391 A.2d 364, 370 (1978)).
117. Comment, supra note 6, at 451.
118. N.C.R. EvID. 403.
119. See supra note 79.
120. People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 243-44, 681 P.2d 291, 295-96, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 454-55
(1984); ; State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230-31 (Minn. 1982); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235,
241 (Mo. 1984).
121. People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 251, 681 P.2d 291, 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 460 (1984);
State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 231 (Minn. 1982); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 241 (Mo.
1984).
122. Stafford, 77 N.C. App. at 20, 334 S.E.2d at 800.
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a rape prosecution." 12 3 In reference to descriptions by the expert of the severe
emotional distress suffered by the alleged victim in the weeks subsequent to the
attack, the court concluded "there is no question but that such evidence was
12 4
properly received."
Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court stated that "[p]roperly qualified, an
expert... may testify that the patient, client, or victim does possess and exhibit
the characteristics consistent with those resulting from a traumatic stress reaction, such as rape." 125 The court, however, refused to admit the expert's testimony because he "went too far in expressing his opinion that the victim suffered
1 26
rape trauma syndrome as a consequence of the incident with the defendant."
Had the expert merely stated that the victim's symptoms were consistent with "a
1 27
stressful sexual experience" the court would have admitted his testimony.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals in Stafford should have held Dr.
Ponzi's testimony admissible because his testimony satisfied the requirements of
rule 803(4). Furthermore, because he did not state that he believed the alleged
victim had in fact been raped, his testimony concerning rape trauma syndrome
did not invade the province of the jury. Finally, given the facts of Stafford the
probative value of Dr. Ponzi's testimony outweighed any prejudicial effect it
might have had. 128 In avoiding the issue of the admissibility of rape trauma
syndrome evidence, the North Carolina Court of Appeals applied an extremely
narrow interpretation of rule 803(4). If followed, Stafford will make it even
more difficult for the prosecution to prove incestuous rape. Considering the seriousness of the problem of sexual child abuse in our society, the North Carolina
Supreme Court should reject the appellate court's narrow interpretation of rule
803(4) and admit expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome.
TIMOTHY C. HOLM

123. People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 251, 681 P.2d 291, 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 460 (1984).
124. Id.
125. State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 240 (Mo. 1984).
126. Id. (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 241. See also State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982). Although the Minnesota Supreme Court flatly refused to admit testimony concerning typical post-rape symptoms and
behavior of rape victims, the court stated that while expert testimony concerning the credibility of a
witness is normally inadmissible, it is admissible in unusual cases such as "a sexual assault case
where the alleged victim is a child or mentally retarded." Id. at 231. Because Dr. Ponzi's testimony
had the effect of supporting Tammy's credibility, it is conceivable that even the Minnesota Supreme
Court would have admitted the testimony.
128. See supra notes 97-100 & 112-17 and accompanying text.

